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TO CHARGE OR NOT TO CHARGE, THAT IS
DISCRETION: THE PROBLEM OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN CHILE, AND JAPAN’S SOLUTION
Kirtland C. Marsh†
Abstract: Chile’s recent criminal procedure reform is an ambitious program to
bring greater transparency, fairness, and effectiveness to the country’s legal system.
However, the success of the reform is not assured. To a great extent, the reform’s
success will depend on the new national Office of the Public Prosecutor’s ability to
enforce laws and direct law enforcement within the confines of the new system.
Prosecutors must balance the interests of the Chilean public’s demands for order and
convictions with the reform’s underlying principles of impartiality and enhanced rights
for defendants. If prosecutors resort to the excesses used by investigating judges under
the old system, the reform’s goal of enhanced defendant rights will be thwarted. On the
other hand, if prosecutors are unable to secure convictions and adequately direct law
enforcement, Chileans will lose faith in the viability of the new system. Chile’s criminal
procedure reform can succeed, but it will depend a great deal upon skillful use of
prosecutorial discretion in charging cases. In crafting a viable solution to the challenge
of managing prosecutorial discretion, Chile should look to the model of Japan’s
prosecution review commissions.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 16, 2005, the final phase of Chile’s criminal procedure
reform went into effect, culminating a revolution in the country’s criminal
justice system and marking a significant milestone in Chile’s transition to
modern democracy.1 During the past twenty years, Chile has undergone a
dramatic transformation admired throughout the region and the world. As
an extension of that transformation, Chile’s movement to reform its Code of
Criminal Procedure was driven by its desire to be “on the same standing as
other nations of the world, whose justice systems have efficient ways of
protecting [individual] rights and liberties.”2
Firmly established as an important trading partner with countries in
Asia and North America, Chile has emerged as one of the most dynamic

†
J.D., expected 2007. The author wishes to thank Professor Helen Anderson and the editorial staff
of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their valuable assistance.
1
Ronald Abramson, After the Revolution, It’s Time to Arm the Lawyers, 9 PIERCE L. MAG. 2 (2005),
http://www.resources.piercelaw.edu/pubs/PLwin05vol9no1/2-5.pdf.
2
Claudio Pavlic, Legal Reform: The Role of Public Institutions and Legal Culture, 35 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 237, 256 (2005) (a supervising public defender under a new system in Chile, speaking at a
symposium at California Western School of Law); see also CÓDIGO PROCESAL PENAL [Code of Criminal
Procedure], available at http://www.defensoriapenal.cl/archivos /1132775062.pdf.
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countries in the Pacific Rim.3 According to a recent United Nations study,
the rapid rise in Chileans’ standard of living in the past decade is nearly
without comparison worldwide.4 Chile has been described as “the Asian
economy in the heart of Latin America.”5 Much of Chile’s success can be
traced to its successful engagement with its trading partners in the Pacific
Rim. 6
Developing countries throughout Latin America and the Pacific region
look to Chile as a successful model of government reform.7 While many
other Latin American countries struggle to achieve full democracy and
sustained economic growth, the “Chilean model” is praised throughout the
region as a successful example of development.8 With a robust economy
that grew at seven percent in the 1990s and five percent in 2005,9 Chile has
become the most prosperous country in South America.10 In many respects,
Chile has successfully transformed itself into the “crown jewel of Latin
America.”11 The World Economic Forum, in a report released in September
of 2005 ranked Chile twenty-third internationally in terms of economic
3

See MARY LOU LATHROP, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE PORTS INDUSTRY SECTOR: CHILE (Sept.
7, 2002), http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr111423e.html. Chile’s growth is firmly
rooted in its burgeoning trade with other Pacific nations. With a Pacific coastline of nearly 4000 miles
strategically located on the southwest coast of South America, Chile is considered the continent’s door to
the South Pacific and Asia. Chile represents the ideal point of transfer for trade between South America
and trading partners in Australia, New Zealand, the Far East, North America and Central America. See also
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK, FIELD LISTING – EXPORTS - PARTNERS (Jan. 10,
2006), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2050.html (noting that Chile’s top four export
partners in 2004 were all Pacific Rim countries: the United States (14%), Japan (11.4%), China (9.9%),
South Korea (5.5%)).
4
Rob Foulkes, Chile Jumps Six Places in United Nations Development Report, THE SANTIAGO
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005 (quoting Chilean Sociologist, Aldo Mascareño: “Chile is one of the countries that has
registered the greatest improvement in terms of human development. In this sense, it is comparable only to
Hong Kong, which is 22nd in the U.N. report”).
5
Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile and Singapore: The Individual and the Collective, A
Comparison, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 739, 791 (1998) (quoting David Pilling, Keeping an Eye on the Old
Tiger – The Emerging Investor, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1993, at 24).
6
Chile’s expanding Pacific trade led to its invitation to become one of the first Latin American
countries to enter the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation trade group (“APEC”), a multilateral trade
forum. See Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 5, at 791. With 21 member economies around the Pacific
Rim, APEC’s members account for more than 2.5 billion people, a combined gross domestic product of
U.S. $19 trillion and 47% of world trade. See APEC, ABOUT APEC, http://www.apec .org/apec/
about_apec.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2005) (inclusion in the group and hosting the annual APEC Forum
in 2004 are expected by the Chilean government to have a major impact on Chile’s future development).
7
Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 5, at 846-47.
8
Writing the Next Chapter in a Latin American Success Story, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2005, at 48.
9
Id.
10
See Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 5, at 790; see also Writing the Next Chapter in a Latin
American Success Story, supra note 8 (commenting that if Chile continues the rate of growth it has enjoyed
during the past decade for another ten years, it will reach the same level of income per person as European
Union countries like Greece and Portugal).
11
Abramson, supra note 1, at 2.
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competitiveness, far ahead of the next-ranked Latin American country,
Uruguay, at fifty-fourth.12
Sometimes regarded internationally as a “good house in a bad
neighbourhood,”13 Chile is carefully studied by its neighbors. Other Latin
American countries have attempted judicial reform in response to
dissatisfied electorates but have had mixed success.14 If Chile can
successfully implement its criminal procedure reform, the effects could
reverberate throughout South American legal systems.
Chile has implemented numerous reforms to strengthen its
democracy. Among these reforms are its Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation, which was founded to address the brutal crimes of the
Pinochet regime.15 In September 2005, Chile drafted a new constitution,16
which promises to further strengthen the country’s democratic institutions
and reduce the armed forces’ power over the government, a vestige of the
Pinochet era.17 As pivotal as these reforms have been to Chilean society, the
wholesale reform of Chile’s Code of Criminal Procedure may have the
furthest reaching and most sustained effects on the country.
The reform is ambitious in scope, and applying the provisions of
Chile’s new Code of Criminal Procedure is fraught with difficulty. In
crafting workable procedures for operating the new system effectively,
Chilean legal scholars have consulted international approaches to criminal
procedure.18 In so doing, Chile should look to Japan. Another Pacific Rim
nation that has been propelled by rapid economic expansion, Japan also
shifted from an inquisitorial criminal process to an adversarial system.19
Furthermore, Japan’s criminal procedure has grappled with regulating the
12
See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2005 – 2006, GROWTH
COMPETITIVENESS INDEX RANKINGS AND 2004 COMPARISONS, http://www.weforum.org/ pdf/Global_
Competitiveness_Reports/Reports/GCR_05_06/GCI_Rankings_pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
13
Going It Alone, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2003 at 41.
14
Luz Estella Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 345, 379 (2000).
15
David Bosco, Santiago’s Aftershocks, LEGAL AFF. 67 (July/Aug. 2002); See also PAMELA
CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE UNDER PINOCHET (1991) (detailing
repressive tactics used by the fascist government of General Augusto Pinochet, who ruled Chile from 1973
to 1990).
16
Constitución Política de la República de Chile (Constitution of the Republic of Chile),
https://www.presidencia.cl/view/pop-up-nueva-constitucion-texto.asp.
17
Democratic at Last, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 2005, at 60.
18
See generally ANTONIO MARANGUNIC, MINISTERIO PÚBLICO OF CHILE, & TODD FOGLESONG,
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CHARTING JUSTICE REFORM IN CHILE: A COMPARISON OF THE OLD AND NEW
SYSTEMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2004) [hereinafter MARANGUNIC & FOGLESONG], http://www.vera
.org/publication_pdf/254_498.pdf (analyzing conviction rates and procedural efficiency).
19
Mark D. West, Note, Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan’s Answer to the Problem of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 687 (1992).
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conduct of powerful public prosecutors.20 To ensure the success of Chile’s
criminal procedure reform, Chilean legal officials must confront the issue of
regulating prosecutorial discretion in charging cases.21 Japan’s unique
solution to the problem—prosecution review commissions composed of
laypersons22—should be studied by Chile’s legal reformers as an effective
mechanism for regulating the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Part II of this comment examines Chile’s criminal procedure reform
by tracing the roots of the reform and explaining the mechanics and the
implications of the newly created system. Part III analyzes the role of the
national Office of the Public Prosecutor within the new system. Part IV
describes the recent experience of prosecutors under the criminal procedure
reform and assesses the Office of the Public Prosecutor’s success in
discharging its duties. Part V examines Japan’s approach to prosecutorial
discretion and its applicability to Chile’s justice system. Part VI anticipates
future challenges to Chile’s criminal procedure reform and proposes an
approach for effectively managing prosecutorial discretion.
II.

CHILE’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM CREATES
MORE COMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRACY

A JUSTICE

SYSTEM

The movement to reform Chile’s criminal justice system was rooted in
popular perception that the colonial-style inquisitorial system, which had
been in place throughout the twentieth century, was not compatible with the
democratic society Chile hoped to achieve.23 Widespread reaction amongst
the Chilean public to the human rights abuses of the Pinochet dictatorship
also influenced the desire for a reformed criminal procedure, as did the
inability of the Chilean state to safeguard essential individual rights.24 In
addition to better protection for defendants, Chileans also were widely
concerned about improving public safety and the efficiency of the criminal
justice system.25 The reform of Chile’s Code of Criminal Procedure
represents a massive effort by the national government, and with a total cost

20

A. Didrick Castberg, Prosecutorial Independence in Japan, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 38 (1997).
Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousiño, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: The Rule of Law and
Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 323, 338-39 (1998).
22
West, supra note 19, at 694.
23
Abramson, supra note 1, at 2.
24
de la Barra, supra note 21, at 324.
25
Id. at 326.
21
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estimated at U.S. $550,000,000,26 the reform is thought to be the single most
expensive governmental endeavor in Chile’s history.27
A.

The Criminal Procedure Reform Is Dedicated to Reconciling State
Power with Individual Rights

Chile’s Ministry of Justice maintains that the stated goal of the new
system is to resolve social conflicts in a way that is timely, transparent,
impartial, accessible, and respectful of people’s fundamental rights.28 Put
more simply, the reform is designed to create a modern justice system that is
capable of efficiently reconciling the punitive power of the state with robust
safeguards of individual rights.29 The new system aims to redress the
deficiencies of the old Code of Criminal Procedure and conduct criminal
trials openly.30 Trials under the new criminal procedure should be speedy
(i.e., not subject to protracted delays).31 The new criminal procedure also
emphasizes alternatives to imprisonment and has a greater focus on
preserving defendants’ rights.32
The new framework stands in marked contrast to the former criminal
procedure system. Under the old system, a prosecutor took a police report
regarding an offense and would conduct a sealed investigation.33 Then,
sometimes years later, the prosecutor would make a decision as to whether
enough information had been gathered to charge the defendant.34 The same
prosecutor who had charged the defendant then became the judge in the
case.35 Criminal defense practice consisted of technical motions without
court appearances or a chance to confront witnesses.36 Almost invariably,
26
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT OF CHILE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM 23 (2005)
http://www.chileangovernment.cl/pdf/CriminalProcedureReform.pdf (explaining the procedural reform in
English) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM].
27
Abramson, supra note 1, at 3.
28
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 5.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.; see also MARANGUNIC & FOGLESONG, supra note 18, at 6 (criminal prosecutions examined in
this research study indicated that ninety-six percent of cases involving an arrest were resolved within a
fifteen-month period under the new system, as opposed to an eighty-seven percent resolution rate for the
same time period under the old system).
32
See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 5.
33
Abramson, supra note 1, at 3.
34
Id.; see also James L. Bischoff, Note, Reforming the Criminal Procedure System in Latin America,
9 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 27, 40 (2003) (“An incredible seventy percent of Latin American prison inmates
are there awaiting trial. Indeed, the length of pretrial incarceration often exceeds the maximum sentence
the accused could receive if actually convicted of the crime for which he has not yet been indicted”).
35
Abramson, supra note 1, at 3.
36
Id.
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defendants were found guilty, but sentencing decisions could be indefinitely
withheld, often resulting in long-term detentions without formal
determinations of guilt.37 The secretive nature of the process invited
corruption, abuse of power, and nepotism.38 In design, the new system
offers a vast improvement over the old criminal procedure.39 With its
greater emphasis on due process and division of power between actors, the
reform promises better protection of individual rights.
B.

Chile’s Criminal Procedure Reform Is the Product of an Extensive
Legislative Process

Propelled by the public’s demands during the 1990s for better
protections for defendants and more efficient administration of justice, the
Chilean Congress enacted legislation to reform the Code of Criminal
Procedure.40 Beginning with Law 19.519,41 which established the Office of
the Public Prosecutor in September 1997, and concluding with Law
19.696,42 which established the National Public Defender in March 2001,
Congress passed legislation over the course of five years implementing the
new Code of Criminal Procedure.43
The process of installing the new criminal system has relied on central
coordination and gradual implementation.44 The Commission on the
Coordination of the Criminal Procedure Reform, comprised of the Minister
of Justice who presides over the Commission, the Supreme Court Chief
Justice, the National Prosecutor, and the National Public Defender, along
with several other officials, coordinated the reform.45 Under the direction of
the Commission, the reform was gradually implemented throughout Chile.46
The reform’s implementation began in the most sparsely populated regions
in December 2000 and culminated with its introduction in metropolitan
37

Id.
Alejandra Matus, The Black Book of Chilean Justice, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 329, 331 (2002).
39
MARANGUNIC & FOGLESONG, supra note 18, at executive summary.
40
See Abramson, supra note 1, at 2.
41
Lydia Tiede, Commitment to Justice: An Analysis of Criminal Law Reforms in Chile 15 (U.C. San
Diego, Ctr. for Iberian and Latin Am. Stud., Working Paper No. 22, 2004), http://repositories
.cdlib.org/cilas/papers/22.
42
Id.
43
See Tiede, supra note 41, at 11 n.27 (listing the six relevant statutes from Chile’s Diario Official:
Ley No. 19.665, Mar. 9, 2000; Ley No. 19.708 and Ley No. 19.665, January 5, 2001; Ley No. 19.519, Oct.
15, 1999; Ley No. 19.640, Oct. 15, 1999; Ley No. 19.718, Mar. 10, 2001; and Ley No. 19.696, Oct. 12,
2000).
44
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 9.
45
Id.
46
Id.
38
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Santiago in June 2005.47 The reform has been implemented in five regional
stages with an initial caseload of zero, meaning the new criminal procedure
is not applied retroactively.48 Courts using the old system will continue to
handle all crimes committed before that date.49 This approach was designed
to avoid any overload or congestion left by the old system.50
C.

Separate and Distinct Judicial System Personnel Roles Will Drive the
New System

A variety of new mechanisms are designed to achieve the goals of the
reform. Foremost among these is the clear and strict division of authority
among three separate entities: judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors.51
These three actors, tasked with new responsibilities, will in large part
determine the reform’s effectiveness.
The role of judges under the new system is a dramatic departure from
the earlier model. Under the old Code of Criminal Procedure, there were
seventy-nine judges throughout Chile who were responsible for investigating
crimes, filing charges, and sentencing defendants in all of the criminal cases
that passed through the nation’s judicial system.52 Under the new system,
despite their objections, the responsibilities of judges have been radically
curtailed.53 Further, judges themselves are now divided into two categories:
supervisory judges (jueces de garantías) and oral criminal trial court judges
(tribunales del juicio oral en lo penal).54 Under the new system, there are
420 of the former and 396 of the latter.55 With more than 800 judges total,
the new system represents a tenfold increase in judges to oversee Chile’s
criminal trials.56 This massive increase in judicial resources is certain to
impact the speed and efficiency of Chile’s trials, which early reports indicate
are much improved.57
Supervisory judges, who are similar to magistrates in the U.S. system,
are responsible for granting pretrial authorizations requested by the Public
Prosecutor’s Office relating to actions that might impact a defendant’s
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 13.
de la Barra, supra note 21, at 329.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 13, 15.
MARANGUNIC & FOGLESONG, supra note 18, at 13.
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constitutional rights.58
Supervisory judges direct hearings during
investigation and pretrial phases59 and are responsible for the controversial
process of determining whether to release defendants prior to trial or to
remand them to pretrial custody.60
The role of criminal trial court judges under the new system
represents a departure from the earlier Code of Criminal Procedure. Under
the new system, trial court judges sit on three-member panels that hear oral
arguments and are responsible for both the judgment and sentencing of
defendants, as there are no juries under the Chilean system.61
Defense attorneys under the new system have a greatly enhanced role
compared to their status under the old model.62 Created by Law 19.718,63
passed in March 2001, the Criminal Public Defender’s Office (Defensoría
Penal Pública) is composed of a National Defender and regional and local
defenders spread throughout the country.64 As opposed to the previous
system, where poorly trained law students could be assigned as counsel,
public defenders under the new system are attorneys with a certified level of
competence.65 Of the public defenders, 145 are government employees, and
an additional 270 defense attorney positions are awarded by contract to
private attorneys in a public bidding system.66
Finally, the responsibility for overseeing investigation of crimes,
pressing charges, and prosecuting cases falls on the Office of the Public
Prosecutor (Ministerio Publico). 67 Because the role of the prosecutor under
the reform is so new to Chile, and prosecutors must now shoulder the burden
of directing law enforcement and protecting public safety,68 the Prosecutor’s
Office is under great scrutiny. In order to achieve an effective criminal
justice system, judges and defense attorneys must learn new skills and attain
58

Abramson, supra note 1, at 4; see also CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 9.
Tiede, supra note 41, at 12-13.
60
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 13.
61
Abramson, supra note 1, at 3.
62
de la Barra, supra note 21, at 348-49; see also Abramson, supra note 1, at 3 (“under the old
system, criminal defense practice consisted of filing highly technical motions, with no court appearances,
chance for confronting witnesses or other opportunities for zealous, or any, advocacy”).
63
Tiede, supra note 41, at 17 n.44.
64
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 17.
65
Tiede, supra note 41, at 17-18; see also Sofia Libedinsky, The Reform of the Criminal Justice
System in Chile: From an Inquisitorial to an Adversarial System, Feb. 2005, at 3,
http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=102833 (explaining that although a legal aid service
had already existed, defense was provided by law students in the last year of their studies, cases were
transferred frequently because students only worked for a six month period, and the quality of
representation was low).
66
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 17.
67
de la Barra, supra note 21, at 332.
68
de la Barra, supra note 21, at 332-35.
59
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competence in their roles under the new system. One of the greatest
challenges of the reform will be changing the legal culture in Chile with the
same actors playing new roles.69 However, public prosecutors, new figures
in the Chilean criminal system,70 may have the greatest challenge as they
adapt to a role that has never before existed in Chile.71
III.

THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR MUST BE EFFECTIVE FOR THE
REFORM TO SUCCEED

The Office of the Public Prosecutor has assumed some of the most
fundamental powers of inquisitorial judges under the old system, as it is
responsible for overseeing law enforcement and charging cases.72 Those
responsibilities were formerly vested in a relatively small number of
experienced judges with heavy caseloads, who were also responsible for
reaching a verdict.73 In contrast, the new system consists of a relatively
large number of inexperienced lawyers who manage law enforcement and
seek convictions.74 It is difficult to determine how well they will respond to
the challenge of meeting their new responsibilities.75
A.

The Office of the Public Prosecutor Is Novel to Chile’s Justice System

The Office of the Public Prosecutor was created through
constitutional reform by Law 19.519 in September 1997.76 In 1999, the
Chilean Congress passed Law 19.640, which set forth the responsibilities,
operational guidelines, and limitations of the prosecutor’s office.77 The
National Prosecutor (Fiscal Nacional del Ministerio Público), Guillermo

69

de la Barra, supra note 21, at 333.
Id. at 332.
71
Mauricio J. Duce, The Role of the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Latin America’s Criminal
Procedure Reform: An Overview 7, http://www.cejamericas.org/doc/documentos/reforma-mp2-ing.pdf (last
visited Jan. 13, 2006).
72
Tiede, supra note 41, at 16.
73
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 13.
74
Id. at 15.
75
See Bosco, supra note 15, at 69 (commenting that some Chileans “fear that ill-prepared
prosecutors, in particular, will cause a breakdown in the system . . . it will be painful for judges to watch
prosecutors stumble, particularly because public ire at resulting acquittals will likely singe the judiciary.
‘Santiago will be a trial by fire,’ says Paulina Sanchez, a young magistrate at the capital”).
76
MINISTERIO PUBLICO, QUIENES SOMOS, QUE ES EL MINISTERIO PUBLICO (2004),
http://www.ministeriopublico.cl/default.asp?cuerpo=31 (English translation of Public Prosecutor’s Office
resources and functions available on Public Ministry’s website).
77
See Law 19.640, http://www.ministeriopublico.cl/default.asp?cuerpo=31 (last visited Oct. 10,
2005).
70
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Piedrabuena Richard, directs the Office of the Public Prosecutor.78 The
office has 642 prosecutors, along with approximately 3000 staff members,
who are distributed over sixteen regional prosecutors’ offices.79 The Public
Prosecutor’s Office was appropriated the equivalent of U.S. $218,000,000,
making it the recipient of nearly forty percent of the resources allocated by
Congress to the reform.80
The most crucial element of Chile’s criminal procedure reform is the
separation of duties between judges and prosecutors.81 Chile’s government
emphasizes that the mission of prosecutors under the reform is to investigate
criminal acts, determine punishable participation, prosecute criminal action,
and adopt measures for protecting victims and witnesses.82 However, the
government makes clear that “under no circumstances does the [Office of the
Public Prosecutor] hear or adjudicate cases.”83 Prosecutorial duties have
been completely separated from the judicial branch.84 The Office of the
Public Prosecutor is entrusted with impartially discharging its new
responsibilities, including deciding which cases to charge and which cases to
dismiss.85 This power to select which cases to charge is commonly referred
to as prosecutorial discretion.86
B.

Prosecutors Are Entrusted with an Expansive Power of Discretion

Prosecutorial discretion, pursuant to Law 19.640, Title I, Section III,87
and Article 248 of the Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure,88 vests
prosecutors with the power to either charge or dismiss a case. Termed “the
discretion problem”89 by some commentators, there is concern surrounding
the prosecutors’ newly acquired power.90 Under the old system, charging
78
MINISTERIO PUBLICO, profile of National Prosecutor Guillermo Piedrabuena Richard,
http://www.ministeriopublico.cl/index.asp (follow “fiscalia nacional” hyperlink, then follow “quien es
Guillermo Piedrabuena Richard” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
79
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM, supra note 26, at 15.
80
Id. at 27.
81
Abramson, supra note 1, at 3.
82
MINISTERIO PUBLICO, OPP FACT SHEET (2004), http://www.ministeriopublico.cl /index.asp
(follow “English Version” hyperlink; then follow “OPP Fact Sheet”).
83
Id.
84
Id.; see generally de la Barra, supra note 21.
85
Tiede, supra note 41, at 16.
86
de la Barra, supra note 21, at 338-340; see also West, supra note 19, at 684-86 (analyzing origins
and international variations of prosecutorial discretion).
87
Law 19.640, supra note 77.
88
CÓDIGO PROCESAL PENAL, art. 248.
89
de la Barra, supra note 21, at 338.
90
Id.; see also e-mail from Felipe Marín, Professor of Law, Diego Portales University in Santiago,
Chile, to author (Oct. 17, 2005, 09:20:00 PST) [hereinafter Marin] (on file with the author) (commenting
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discretion only occurred in the sealed investigative phase, and the only
people with influence over the decision to charge were judges, police, and
lawyers with personal connections to judges or the police department.91 The
potential for corruption was considerable, as there was little independent
oversight into which cases were charged and which cases were dismissed.92
Subsequent to the reform, charging discretion is vested in prosecutors,
though with some judicial oversight.93 Prosecutors, however, may still
dismiss charges administratively (referred to as archivo provisional or
principio de oportunidad) and do not require judicial authorization to do
so.94 The new system relies on an evolving relationship between prosecutors
and supervisory judges in filing criminal cases.95
Ideally, the discretion now granted to prosecutors will produce more
efficient case selection, reduce the overall caseload, and consequently aid
judges in setting appropriate sentences.96 However, some judges have
resisted having their authority curtailed and have asserted their influence in
the sentencing process.97 This is expressly prohibited by the reform, as
Article 80 of Law 19.640 explicitly gives prosecutors autonomy in directing
criminal investigations.98 Determining which cases to prosecute remains one
of the central responsibilities of prosecutors in an adversarial system.99
Therein is the most dangerous power of prosecutors, according to former
U.S. Attorney General Robert Jackson—charging individuals that they think
they should punish rather than picking cases that need to be prosecuted.100
If Chile’s criminal procedure reform is to succeed, public prosecutors
must competently and professionally discharge their duties. Prosecutors will
need to employ skillful advocacy and careful use of charging discretion to
that during the Chilean presidential race of 2005, there was a great deal of controversy surrounding
prosecutorial conduct under the new system).
91
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92
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regional prosecutors), http://www.ministeriopublico.cl/index.asp (follow “oficios” hyperlink under “oficios
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meet their responsibilities under the reform. Their success or failure will be
apparent in the coming years.
IV.

PROSECUTORS WORKING IN THE NEW SYSTEM HAVE MADE
ENCOURAGING PROGRESS BUT MUST CONTINUE TO IMPROVE

Since the reform’s inception, prosecutors have struggled to fulfill their
duties.101 Conflicts have arisen between prosecutors and supervisory judges
concerning the proper balance of authority for directing investigations.102
Public perception of the reform in Chile has reflected a concern that order
will be difficult to maintain under the new system.103 Throughout the
reform’s implementation, there has been popular and political pressure for
prosecutors to deliver convictions.104 However, early results from the
system’s implementation in Santiago are encouraging and demonstrate that
the new justice system is more likely to resolve cases quickly and efficiently,
producing convictions within a reasonable amount of time.105
A.

The Reform’s Early Results Have Been Encouraging

The first month of the new system’s implementation appeared to be
successful. Since the first arrests were made shortly after 12:00 a.m. on June
17, 2005—the first morning of the reform in Santiago—the capital city has
enjoyed relatively smooth enactment of the reform’s provisions. 106 During
just the first month of the reform in metropolitan Santiago, more than 21,000
cases were processed, nearly 5000 cases were quickly resolved, and over
2000 public trials were conducted.107 President Ricardo Lagos commented
that the early results were promising and reinforced the government’s
optimism about the change in the judicial system.108 Contemporaneous
government statistics also indicated a substantial drop in crime.109 Despite
101
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these early positive indicators, public concerns remain regarding the
perceived lenience of prosecutors, particularly with respect to reduced
pretrial detention and juvenile crime.110
B.

New Procedures for Pretrial Detention Have Met with Public
Resistance

Chile’s new system of pretrial detention is controversial. In the prereform era, defendants were often held for years before being tried, resulting
in backlogged court calendars.111 Chile’s system mirrored those in the rest
of Latin America, where excessive pretrial detention is an enduring human
rights problem.112 In response to this problem, the reform empowered
supervisory judges to decide whether a detainee, once arrested, should go
free or remain in protective custody.113 This particular feature of the reform
has been met with criticism. Chile’s President publicly attacked the policy
of granting provisional liberty as being too lenient.114 Supreme Court Justice
Marcos Libedinsky, however, defended the new authority of judges to grant
provisional liberty and its foundation in the presumption of innocence,
which is an important feature of the new reform.115
Presuming defendants to be innocent remains an alien concept in
much of Chile, and the criticism of pretrial release reflects the deeply held
public suspicion about some aspects of the reform.116 In response to
criticism of the pretrial release policy, Chile’s government announced plans
in September 2005 to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure and eliminate
provisional liberty for criminal offenders.117 While much of the criticism
was fueled by political considerations during an ongoing presidential race,118
the willingness of the government to consider abandoning pretrial release of
defendants less than six months after the reform’s enactment indicates the
uncertainty surrounding the reform itself.
110
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Responding Effectively to Juvenile Crime Is One of the Justice
System’s Most Difficult Challenges

Juvenile crime is a pressing social problem in Chile. Statistical and
anecdotal evidence underlies the perception among the Chilean public that
juvenile crime is one of the most widespread and destructive sources of
crime in Chile.119 According to a recent study, between 1986 and 2002,
arrests of juvenile offenders in Chile rose by nearly 400 percent.120 Highprofile violent home invasions by groups of teenagers in affluent coastal
communities during the summer of 2005 reinforced the public’s perception
that juvenile crime has become a severe problem.121 Under the old criminal
system, minors were usually given lenient punishment by the courts.122
Under a law passed by Congress in October 2005, minors between the ages
of fourteen and sixteen can face five-year prison sentences for serious
crimes, and minors between sixteen and eighteen years of age can receive a
maximum ten-year sentence.123 While the maximum sentences are harsh,
the legislation’s main goal is to improve rehabilitation programs for
minors,124 and Chile’s government has constructed new “closed” and “semiclosed” detention centers where juvenile inmates can receive counseling and
treatment.125 However, questions about implementation of the new law
remain, particularly regarding how prosecutors might use their charging
discretion in cases involving juveniles.126
D.

Public Trials and Powerful Defendants: The Senator Lavendero Case
Is an Early Indicator of the Strengths and Weaknesses of the New
System

In June 2005, Senator Jorge Lavendero of Chile’s Christian Democrat
Party pled guilty to child molestation in open court.127 A powerful senator
119
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from Region IX in Chile’s south, Lavendero was highly regarded for his
longtime opposition to the Pinochet dictatorship.128 The senator’s trial took
place in Temuco, a region of Chile where the criminal procedure reform
went into effect in December 2000.129 Lavendero’s confession has been
hailed as the reform’s first high-profile success.130
Many believe that Lavendero entered a guilty plea as a direct result of
Chile’s newly reformed Code of Criminal Procedure.131 Under the old
system, the trial would have been conducted in secret, consisting of written
motions and arguments made to one judge with complete discretion to
decide Lavendero’s fate.132 For decades, equality before the law was more
slogan than reality, and influential Chileans were able to leverage their
positions for favorable treatment by the court.133 Under the new system,
Senator Lavendero was faced with the prospect of a damning public oral
trial. The charges were not secret, and an autonomous prosecutor was
responsible for pressing charges.134 Despite his political power, Lavendero
was forced to answer to criminal charges.135
Lavendero’s admission of guilt, however, was marred by a Supreme
Court verdict ordering the dismissal of Region IX’s Public Prosecutor
Esmirna Vidal for negligence in her investigations of Lavendero.136 Vidal
was dismissed by Chile’s Attorney General following charges that she failed
to properly investigate the case and provided inadequate protection to
witnesses.137 Vidal’s dismissal underscores the reform’s early challenges
and demonstrates that many lawyers still find the new trial format a difficult
adjustment.138 Despite the difficulty lawyers have in adapting to the current
system, the new Code of Criminal Procedure helps to ensure that powerful
public figures are not above the law and represents an important step in
strengthening Chilean democracy.
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Chile’s Prosecutors Would Benefit from an External Review of Their
Discretion

The initial difficulties that have beset prosecutors in the early stages
of the reform’s implementation demonstrate the complexity of prosecutors’
role under the new system. In light of this complexity, Chile’s legal
reformers would be well-advised to institute an external mechanism to
oversee prosecutorial decision-making. In creating such a mechanism, Chile
should look to the example set by another Pacific nation that rapidly shifted
from authoritarianism to democracy and modified an inquisitorial criminal
procedure code into an adversarial system. Chile should examine the
solution adopted by Japan in constructing a system to manage the problem
of prosecutorial discretion.
V.

JAPAN’S PROSECUTION
FOR CHILEAN REFORM

REVIEW COMMISSIONS ARE

A

USEFUL MODEL

The Japanese approach to regulating prosecutorial discretion is an
instructive example for legal reformers in Chile grappling with the issue of
properly administering prosecution. In Japan, if a prosecutor decides not to
indict a suspect in a case, the victim of the crime may request a hearing
regarding the prosecutor’s decision.139
Hearings are conducted by
prosecution review commissions (kensatsu shinsakai), sometimes referred to
as committees for the inquest of prosecution.140 Even if there is no request
by victims to review decisions to suspend prosecution, review commissions
may investigate prosecutors’ decisions of their own volition.141 Despite the
differences in Japan’s society and system of justice from those of Chile,
Japan’s prosecution review commissions represent an innovative approach
to a common problem—balancing the discretionary powers of prosecutors
with public oversight.
A.

Prosecution Review Commissions Are the Product of Japan’s
Unique Legal History

During the Meiji reforms of the late nineteenth century, Japan
instituted a legal system based primarily on German and French models.142
139
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Within the inquisitorial system, judges and prosecutors were given equal
status in the Japanese Ministry of Justice.143 The power of prosecutors
crested in the 1930s, a period marked by repression and nearly unchecked
police power.144 After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the country’s legal
system changed dramatically, with the judiciary made independent from the
Ministry of Justice and prosecutors granted nearly complete
independence.145 A new constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure were
written,146 and the modern era of Japanese criminal law began.
Under the modern system, Japanese prosecutors are highly
independent, free to indict highly placed politicians and empowered to
suspend prosecution of those who have committed serious crimes.147 Article
248 of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure states that if “after
considering the character, age and situation of the offender, the gravity of
the offense, the circumstances under which the offense was committed, and
conditions subsequent to the commission of the offense, prosecution is
deemed unnecessary, public action may be dispensed with.”148 This
somewhat vague statutory language offers Japanese prosecutors a great deal
of discretion in deciding which cases to prosecute.149 The Japanese justice
system has several procedures to guard against abuses of prosecutorial
discretion. Two of these procedures are administered by the government—
internal review of discretion by superiors within prosecutors’ offices and
judicial review of prosecutors’ decisions.150
Internal review of charging decisions by individual prosecutors is
common, as superiors must usually approve the prosecutors’ decisions.151
Judicial review of prosecutorial decisions is much rarer. Judicial review
(saibanjo no junkiso tetsuzuki) is provided for in Article 262 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure,152 and allows those who object to non-prosecution in
cases of abuse of authority or violence by a public officer to request that a
District Court institute criminal proceedings against the accused.153 The
procedure for complaints is complex, time consuming, and does little to
143
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assure success for applicants.154 As a result, judicial review of prosecutorial
discretion is infrequently used; from 1987 to 1990, 979 requests for review
were received and only two resulted in prosecution.155 To supplement these
two government-administered procedures, along with indirect legislative
controls of prosecutors and the court appointment of special prosecutors,
Japan utilizes prosecution review commissions.156
Each prosecution review commission consists of eleven members,
selected by lot from the voter rolls in the local jurisdiction, and each member
serves a six-month term.157 Commissions review decisions not to prosecute
and may begin the investigation process in one of two ways. The
commission may receive requests from victims of crime, or it may initiate
action on its own by a majority vote of its members.158 Each commission is
empowered to summon and interrogate witnesses.159 After investigating,
commissions determine whether indictment is proper or improper.160 A
majority vote is necessary to determine whether nonindictment was proper,
but a supermajority of eight of the eleven members is necessary to determine
that the prosecutor should indict the suspect whose prosecution has been
suspended.161 Currently, decisions of the commissions are advisory only.
Article 41 of the Prosecution Review Commission statute states that the
Chief Prosecutor shall “take proceedings for indictment, if he deems, after
consideration of the decision, a public action should be instituted.”162
Reforms proposed by Japan’s Judicial Reform Council, however, will make
the decision of the commissions binding on prosecutors beginning in
2009.163
After World War II, one of the Allies’ goals was the democratization
of Japan, and the Japanese government was urged to pass the Prosecution
Commission Law of 1948.164 Prosecution review commissions were
expected to promote the goal of democratization in postwar Japan. The
statute creating the review commissions declares its purpose as guaranteeing
“proper and fair execution of the right of public action by reflecting the
154
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popular will.”165 Reportedly, General MacArthur saw the system as one
element of a comprehensive plan to give the Japanese “safeguards to sanctity
of individual liberty.”166
B.

Japan’s Model Promotes Accountability and Accessibility

Three benefits of prosecution review panels are readily discernible:
(1) the system is a watchdog over prosecutors; (2) the availability of
registering complaints helps protect victims’ rights; and (3) the system
encourages participation in the democratic process.167 When commissions
review decisions made by prosecutors not to indict, the commissions act as
an external social check on prosecutors’ discretion.168 This check helps
ensure that prosecutors are diligent in fulfilling their duties, and that the
decision not to indict is not a result of improper influence on the prosecutor.
Even though decisions by the review commissions are not binding, the
commissions create the possibility of negative publicity, and no prosecutor
wants the torrent of media criticism that would result from ignoring a
commission’s recommendation to prosecute.169 In this respect, prosecution
review commissions help ensure that prosecutors are aware of the possible
public backlash from abuse of prosecutorial discretion.170
Furthermore, prosecution review commissions help victims to have a
greater voice within the justice system. Although the recognition of victims’
rights remains inconsistent in Japan,171 victims’ ability to register complaints
about prosecutors who refuse to indict allows them an avenue to contest
improper use of prosecutorial discretion.172
Prosecution review commissions also encourage active civic
participation in the legal process. In Japan’s justice system, the 201
prosecution review commissions around the country are the only opportunity
for the public to directly participate in the criminal justice system.173 The
commissions allow the Japanese public to play a direct role in the
administration of justice, which is normally the exclusive realm of legal
professionals.174 With the commissions, ordinary Japanese citizens are able
165
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to exert direct influence on the legal system. The introduction of the
modified jury system in 2009 is evidence of the growing trend in Japan of
expanded civic participation in the legal process.175
C.

Japan’s Prosecution Review Commissions Have Limitations

For all of its advantages, Japan’s system has some shortcomings. The
principal limitations to Japanese commissions are their underutilization due
to their public obscurity and a lack of enforcement power that impedes their
effectiveness. 176
Prosecution review commissions have not been well publicized, and
many Japanese citizens are unaware that they exist.177 Infrequent use of the
commissions can be attributed to the system’s obscurity, as it is difficult to
assert rights if those rights and a method to exert them are not well
known.178 Furthermore, actors within the justice system do not have an
incentive to better inform the public about the review commissions.
Prosecutors have little motivation to inform citizens of a process that calls
into question their own judgment.179 A review commission’s objection to a
decision not to indict is a criticism of the prosecutor’s discretion, and
consequently prosecutors themselves are not likely to promote the
commissions.180 Private attorneys have no procedural role in review
commissions, and Japan’s Ministry of Justice is too closely linked to the
functions of the Prosecutor’s Office to promote a legal mechanism that acts
as a check on prosecutorial power.181 As a result, the commissions are little
known by the public and are not used often enough.
Furthermore, when prosecution review commissions are used, they are
often not influential in modifying a prosecutor’s decision not to charge.182
In the majority of cases, commissions have approved the suspension of
175
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prosecution.183 According to a 1994 study, commissions dealt with 1691
cases: 1583 cases initiated by victims or proxies; and 108 cases initiated by
the commissions themselves.184 Of those cases, commissions made
recommendations in 1288 of the cases, agreeing with the decision to suspend
prosecution in 878 cases (68%), recommending the cases be prosecuted in
209 cases (16%), and dealing with the remainder of cases in other ways.185
The study indicated that prosecutors initiated prosecution 28% of the time
when recommended by the commission.186 These figures demonstrate that
commissions regularly agree with a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute.
Further, the study shows that even when commissions object to decisions not
to prosecute, Japanese prosecutors have been reluctant to reopen cases. The
Justice System Reform Council’s proposal to make commission decisions
binding187 will counteract that reluctance and give commissions more
authority.
D.

Japan’s System Offers a Practical Solution to the Problem of
Regulating Prosecutorial Discretion

Prosecution review commissions have been a useful mechanism in
postwar Japan’s justice system for ensuring that prosecutors do not abuse
their expansive powers of discretion. Though the system has suffered from
obscurity and under-use, prosecution review commissions have played an
important role in regulating the conduct of Japanese prosecutors and
promoting consistency in charging decisions.188 The commissions were
particularly useful to Japan as it transitioned from its prewar inquisitorial
system to its postwar adversarial system, which resulted in the complex
modification of prosecutors’ role.189 In a society accustomed to inquisitorial
procedure and unified authority, newly adversarial Japanese prosecutors
remained vested with substantial power and discretion.190 To provide a
counterbalance to that power, prosecution review commissions have
183
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provided an avenue for ordinary citizens to challenge decisions made by
public prosecutors. With the advent of binding commission decisions in
2009, the influence of the commissions will expand.191
Like Japan in the twentieth century, Chile in the twenty-first century
has transitioned from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial system and
has consequently reformed the powers of its public prosecutors. Those
prosecutors must balance the goal of successfully prosecuting cases and
demonstrating effectiveness to the public while abstaining from heavyhanded indictments or suspensions of prosecutions resulting from improper
influence. Japan confronted these same challenges, and its principal
response was the institution of prosecution review commissions. It is a
solution that merits the attention of Chile’s legal reformers.
VI.

THE FUTURE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CHILE REQUIRES
MORE PUBLIC INFLUENCE ON THE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS

Chile’s Office of the Public Prosecutor wields a great deal of power
under Chile’s new criminal procedure framework. Chile has instituted
mechanisms aimed at regulating prosecutorial conduct and enhancing
victims’ rights, such as supervisory judges dedicated to ensuring due
process.192 Criminal justice in Chile, however, is still controlled exclusively
by legal professionals and does not provide for public participation in, for
example, juries.193 Chile would be wise to adopt a version of Japan’s system
of prosecution review commissions. A Chilean system of prosecution
review commissions would aid prosecutors in balancing order with restraint
and would help the justice system combat official corruption and repressive
law enforcement. Furthermore, public prosecution review commissions
would help democratize Chile’s legal system and make prosecutors more
consistent and accountable in their decisions to indict and prosecute.
Tasked with pressing criminal charges, prosecutors shoulder a heavy
burden under current reforms. The Chilean public expects a high conviction
rate, and prosecutors are faced with the dual priorities of delivering
measurable results while adhering to the due process standards imposed by
the reform. Under the new system, prosecutors are more likely to produce
convictions within a reasonable amount of time than in the old system.194
Nevertheless, the opportunity remains for prosecutors to overzealously
191
192
193
194
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charge cases. Chile amending the Code of Criminal Procedure and
providing for panels of laypeople to oversee prosecutorial charging decisions
might have the effect of ensuring that prosecutors file charges properly and
more effectively manage their duties to win convictions.
Prosecution review commissions would also serve the important goal
of combating official corruption and police misconduct. One of the most
damaging facets of Chile’s old system of criminal procedure was the ability
of influential defendants to negotiate their way out of criminal charges.195
With public, oral trials and an independent judiciary, the new system has
made this possibility much more remote, as the Senator Lavendero trial
demonstrated.196 However, prosecutors still may be reluctant to prosecute
highly placed officials, particularly if those officials have committed less
serious crimes than the juvenile sexual abuse for which Senator Lavendero
plead guilty. Additionally, the Office of the Public Prosecutor is still under
the direction of the executive branch, which may reduce the office’s
independence and impede the aggressive prosecution of high-ranking
officials charged with misconduct.197
To ensure that all Chileans, including public officials, are subject to
the rule of law, Japanese-style prosecution review commissions could
challenge decisions by prosecutors to suspend prosecution where strong
evidence of criminal conduct exists.198 Even if the commissions’ decisions
were not binding, as Japan’s are not, the prospect of a media barrage of
negative publicity would encourage public prosecutors to consider the
consequences of dropping charges against highly placed officials.199
Further, prosecution review commissions would help combat police
misconduct by exposing cases where suspects were arrested, but the
evidence gathered by police was insufficient to support criminal charges.
Prosecutors would be reluctant to publicize repressive law enforcement, but
public panels of laypersons reviewing prosecutors’ decisions not to charge
might be better sources of oversight in ensuring that police are not
subjecting Chileans to arbitrary arrests.
Prosecution review commissions also have the substantial advantage
of democratizing the legal system. Chile’s legal reformers elected not to
195
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adopt lay juries in criminal trials but rather have given the task of
determining guilt to panels of three judges.200 While the relative advantages
and disadvantages of the jury system are beyond the scope of this comment,
juries do have the effect of democratizing the legal process by involving
ordinary citizens in the most crucial functions of trial courts. 201 In the
absence of juries, Chile would benefit from prosecution review commissions
composed of laypersons and an infusion of popular participation into the
justice system. Providing an opportunity for civic participation would give
the Chilean public a greater sense of empowerment and would help keep the
reformed Code of Criminal Procedure responsive to the population it serves.
Finally, prosecution review commissions should be adopted to make
public prosecutors more consistent and accountable. Currently, individual
prosecutors may subject their charging decisions to the scrutiny of superiors
within their offices or to supervisory judges, but as explained above,
prosecutors may administratively suspend prosecution of cases with no
oversight at all.202 Additionally, to preserve high conviction rates,203
prosecutors may decline to press charges in a case where the evidence
indicates less than a sure victory. Prosecution review commissions would be
a useful mechanism for ensuring accountability and consistency in charging
decisions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Chile’s criminal procedure reform is an admirable initiative with the
potential to have a positive and persistent impact on the vitality of Chile’s
emerging democracy. Despite its early successes, the reform may be
crippled without consistent and impartial prosecution of crimes. In order to
ensure the reform’s success, Chile should implement a version of Japan’s
prosecution review commissions.
Japan, like Chile, adopted an adversarial legal system after
abandoning its inquisitorial system.204 Japanese lawmakers introduced
prosecution review commissions as a mechanism to balance the interest of
powerful public prosecutors in applying their discretion against the interest
of Japanese society in ensuring that prosecutors’ discretion is fairly and
consistently applied.205 Chilean legal scholars have consulted international
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approaches to criminal procedure in order to enhance the effectiveness of
Chile’s reform.206 Japan’s model of prosecution review commissions
presents a compelling international solution for Chile, a country seeking to
regulate its powerful new prosecutors while democratizing its legal
system,207 just as reformers in Japan sought to do sixty years ago.208
Prosecution review commissions offer Chile an opportunity to
increase the stake of citizens in their new justice system. Beyond being the
recipients of better justice, Chileans would be able to take an active part in
making sure justice was done. “A civilized system of law,” wrote U.S.
Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, “is as much concerned with the
means employed to bring people to justice as it is with the ends
themselves.”209 Prosecution review commissions offer Chile’s justice
system better means and better ends. Chilean legal authorities would be
wise to adopt them.
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